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Abstract
[The paper examines the development strategy followed by Gujarat state
government during the nineties. It has followed the strategy focussed on
industrialisation and urbanisation with an open door policy eversince its inception
in 1960. Economic reform measures at the Centre with an explicit emphasis on
trade and industry considerably benefited Gujarat making its economic
performance outstanding.  The state government only facilitated the growth of
private enterprise since its strategy was already consistent with the changes in
the policy reforms at the Centre. Since mid-nineties, however, when the reform
process at the Centre slowed down, the state government in Gujarat started
taking major initiative to liberalise and reform its policies further. In this process,
the focus of the development strategy seems to have shifted away from the
organised manufacturing to the unorganised sectors and giving protection to the
SMEs. It is argued that Gujarat's performance would again pick up as the
national reform process gets back on the track.]
I. Introduction:
   In a multilevel federal democracy a state often represents a middle level
between the central government and the local bodies.  Gujarat had all these 3
layers of government efficiently functioning ever since its inception in 1960.  The
constitution of India provides reasonably clear division of the rights and duties of
different layers of the governments for achieving overall development of the
country.  Within this broad constraints, different state governments in India have
been following their own specific development strategies (see Dholakia, 1994).
During the process of economic policy reforms and liberalisation, the constraints
and regulation on economic activities by the centre in different segments of the
economy got relaxed. The states found more freedom and flexibility to pursue
their own socio-economic agenda.  It is not surprising that different states took
advantage of this increased flexibility according to their physical capabilities,
economic environment and ability to evaluate opportunities and risks involved.
States were required to respond dynamically and compete with each other to
attract the private sector activities by providing the most conducive economic
environment.  During the initial phase of the economic reforms, i.e., 1991-92 to
1997-98, Gujarat outperformed all other states in the country in terms of
economic growth according to the then member, Planning Commission (see,
Ahluwalia, 2000).  It is, therefore, interesting to examine in detail the case of
Gujarat, particularly the economic reforms and the development strategy it has
followed during the nineties.2
Development strategy in Gujarat State has been very clear and
unambiguous ever since its inception in 1960 in according a high priority to
industrialisation as can be seen from various state plans documents and the
socio-economic reviews carried out annually.  The state had made a clear choice
of encouraging the secondary sector activities over the primary and tertiary
sectors’ activities (see, Dholakia, 1994).  It is a well-known fact that Gujarat lags
behind several states in the country in terms of human capital and related
indices.  Between the human capital and physical capital related government
expenditures also, the Gujarat government had consistently accorded higher
priority to the latter (see, Archana Dholakia, 1990).  Thus, the development
strategy of the Gujarat State for industrialisation has been unbalanced growth
with emphasis on directly productive activity (DPA) rather than on creating social
overhead capital (SOC). While this has its own limitation for the overall
development of the state, it has advantages in terms of clarity and consistency of
objectives.  Since Gujarat is well connected to other states in the nation, it has an
access to the highly skilled technical and professional manpower, financial
capital and physical infrastructure like ports, airports and means of
communications from the other states.  Gujarat has followed “an open door”
policy with regard to the factor mobility – particularly the labour mobility in and
out of the state irrespective of the political party in power.  The endeavour of the
Gujarat government has all along been to provide as far as possible the most
conducive environment to promote business and industry in the state irrespective
of who provide and own them.  In this sense, Gujarat did not have to make any
major shift in its basic strategy in the wake of liberalisation and policy reforms at
the central level.
In the next section, we briefly discuss the concept of economic reforms
and liberalisation and their possible impact on the level of economic activity in an
economy.  The specific instruments used by Gujarat State to promote economic
growth through the private sector are, then, discussed in the four subsequent
sections.  Concluding observations are made in the sixth and the final section of
the paper.
II.  Role of State and Economic Reforms:
From 1955 to 1991, India as a nation followed the ideology of socialism and
interventionist policy of direct state participation and control and regulation of
economic activities in the economy.  The process of shift in the ideology from
state intervention to market orientation initiated and speeded up since 1991 in
India implies restoration of functioning of market forces in all markets by
a)  removing or reducing quantity restrictions on supply;
b)  removing price controls or other distortions; and
c)  reducing unjustified or unnecessary market interventions by the
           government.
Liberalisation is a process of relaxing or reducing the direct restrictions,
regulations and controls on and participation in the economic activities by the3
government. Such direct interventions existing prior to liberalisation are
conceptually similar to the quantitative restrictions.  As against this, the
government can also control and regulate the economic activities by imposing
tariffs, charging fees, levying taxes, etc.  These are conceptually similar to the
price-based interventions.   In a federal structure, the price-based reforms in
excise and customs duties, exchange rate and interest rate structure, or
administrative price mechanism typically fall under the jurisdiction of the Central
Government.  State governments can exercise control only in matters pertaining
to sales tax, minor taxes and user charges and fees on services provided by
them. While State Governments largely provide approvals and registration to
smaller enterprises, restricting entry and exit of enterprises through licensing,
reservation and specific legislations is largely under the control of the Central
Government.  The role of a State Government to achieve faster economic growth
under the existing federal structure is limited to what is feasible at the state level
in terms of liberalisation and economic policy reforms on one hand, and the
effective resource base and the socio-cultural environment of the state in relation
to the rest of the country on the other hand.  It can be argued that the latter also
depend on the policies of the state government vis-à-vis other states over a long
period of time.  The process of economic policy reforms and liberalisation at the
state level, therefore, assumes special significance in providing a conducive
environment for attracting and promoting private sector activities in the state.
The dimension of inter-state competition in this regard makes the issue more
complicated.
Generally, economic reforms are linked to the restoration of the functioning of the
market forces in (a) goods markets, (b) services markets, and (c) factor markets
that is likely to promote the growth of private sector by encouraging it (i) to
expand its existing activities in terms of scale and scope,  and  (ii) to participate
in newer activities.  These reforms usually apply uniformly to the existing and the
new participants.  However, competition among states often compels the states
to discriminate between these two sets of participants over varying periods of
time.  As a result, these measures do not represent policy reforms.  Very often
they actually contradict or negate the reforms.  Prudence of ensuring sufficient
revenue generation to be able to afford offering of various sops to attract industry
into the state is often sacrificed with disastrous fiscal consequences in several
states.  These are not very uncommon outcomes in the framework of non-co-
operative games.
Keeping this context in view, we can review the efforts made by Gujarat
government during the nineties to promote the private sector in the state.  Like
several Indian states, Gujarat also used the following three instruments (see,
Sengupta, 1996):  (1) providing tax and cost related incentives; (2) provision of
infrastructure and input supplies; and (3) granting various approvals and
clearances particularly to the small-scale, cottage and tiny sector units (since
these sectors are effectively under the State control).  For Gujarat, we may also
add the fourth district instrument, viz.; (4) restoring the market forces in the land
market in the state. These instruments are reviewed briefly in the following four
sections.4
III.  Tax and Cost Related Incentives:
In the industrial policy of Gujarat State during the nineties, the major instrument
used by the state until recently was reduction, exemption or deferment of sales
tax by the new business and industry to encourage them to locate in the state.
Such measures had the effect of reducing the sales tax revenue collection by the
state. It was estimated that during 1991-95, on an average Rs. 2.10 billion per
annum were lost to Gujarat government on account of such incentives. The
amount increased to Rs. 13.43 billion during 1997-98 and further to about Rs. 20
billion during 1998-99.  Such sales tax related incentives were thought to be very
powerful and all the states entered into the race of offering greater incentives to
attract the private sector units to locate in their territory. This was a harmful
competition for the states to attract industry and business in their territory
because sales tax has been the single most important source of tax revenue for
almost all the states in India, and such incentives very adversely affected its
buoyancy over time. Moreover, there have been serious doubts raised about the
efficacy of such tax-related incentives to attract the private sector activities in the
state (see, Dholakia and Dholakia, 2000; Marvania, 1995, etc.).
External intervention to foster co-operation among states became
necessary.  In the forum of the Finance Ministers and Finance Secretaries of all
the states, it was decided through consensus to implement sales tax reforms
simplifying the rate structure by reducing the number of slabs, accepting uniform
floor rates and allowing no exemptions from January 2000.  This was specifically
intended to remove unhealthy and harmful competition to attract industries in a
state from another state.
1  Gujarat was the first state to implement the floor rates
and remove all exemptions. However, if other states do not follow such a co-
operative decision, the leaders would be forced to bear the cost. Since several
other states found excuses to delay the implementation of the decision, Gujarat
was almost forced to re-look at its industrial policy in terms of increasing several
cost reduction incentives or subsidies to the private sector. Thus, subsidies
substituted the tax exemption and tax reduction.  However, the major advantage
of shifting from the tax related incentives to the cost related incentives is that the
budgetary process becomes more transparent. Previously, the subsidies were
hidden and would not appear in the state budget, whereas now, they are explicit
in the state budget.   Other than this, there are hardly any significant benefits of
such a shift in the policy.
Gujarat’s Industrial and Agro Industries Policies, 2000 have attempted to
provide cost related incentives to the private sector by increasing subsidies in
various forms to attract them to Gujarat and “to make the industries globally
competitive”.  Some of these measures are listed as an illustration in the Box.
                                                          
1 Of course, such rationalization of the sales tax within and across states has several well-known
advantages for efficient public-finance.  It was required also as the necessary preparation for the
introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT).5
Box : Incentives in Gujarat Industrial & Agri Industrial Policies, 2000
a)  Interest Subsidy:  For new units in small-scale industries and service sector
industries, interest subsidy is offered @ 5% p.a. upto a cumulative maximum of
Rs. 2.5 million and Rs. 0.5 million respectively.  For expansion and diversification
of existing units, the interest subsidy is @ 3% p.a. upto a cumulative maximum of
Rs.1.5 million.
b)  R & D Subsidy:  Financial assistance is offered upto Rs. 50 million per industrial
cluster for establishing common facilities covering quality improvement,
technology upgradation, market promotion and technical skills.  Similarly, subsidy
@ 50% of expenses upto Rs. 0.5 million for filing patents on the research by
industries or R&D institutions is offered.
c)  Quality Improvement Assistance:  Industrial units obtaining quality certification
from approved institutions/research laboratories are offered subsidy @ 50% of
expenditure upto a maximum of Rs. 0.2 million.
d)  Backward Area Development:  Industrial units coming up in the identified
backward talukas are offered additional incentives @ 25% under all schemes.
e)  Capital Subsidy:  For self financed new SSI units, a subsidy @ 10% of fixed
capital investment (max. Rs. 1 million); for employment park with employment in
excess of 2500, subsidy @ 10% of capital investment (max Rs. 20 million); for
Hi-tech park, subsidy @ 50% of capital investment (max. Rs. 25 million); for
investment park with investment in excess of Rs.5 billion; for share capital
contribution @ 10% of paid up capital (max. Rs. 25 million); for trade centres of
more than 500 sq. mt. Construction, subsidy upto Rs. 5 million; etc. are offered.
f)  Environmental Protection Assistance: Interest subsidy for the industrial units
undertaking environment protection measures is offered.
g)  Land Provision: Priority accorded to allocation of required land to industrial units
with the “Deemed NA” concept is made more effective.
2  Land is proposed to be
offered at affordable prices to industrial units.
h)  Airfreight Subsidy: For agri-industries and food industries, subsidy (max. of Rs. 1
million per exporter) and subsidy for market development abroad (maximum of
Rs. 50,000 per exporter) are offered.
i)  Project Report Preparation Assistance: A subsidy @ 50% of the cost of project
proposal preparation for agri-industries is offered.
                                                          
2 NA refers to Non-Agricultural use of the land.  Previously, District Collector’s permission was
required in order to acquire the piece of agricultural land to start an industry on it.  Now the
industry is required to inform the Collector within one month of starting the project after acquiring
the land.6
Several observations/comments can be made on the policy of the state to offer
such subsidies with a view to attracting private sector in the state:
1.  There are no in-depth studies or analyses justifying the quantitative extent of
various subsidies and their internal consistency.
2.  The direct subsidies are essentially substituted for the exemptions, reductions
and deferments of the sales tax
3 given earlier and now discontinued under
the co-operative agreement among the state finance ministries in the country.
It seems that the extents of various subsidies are also derived so as to ensure
neutrality of the net impact of the two alternatives on the state budget.
3.  The replacement of the hidden subsidy in the form of tax sops by the above-
mentioned explicit subsidies shows that there is no change in the basic
philosophy, theory or approach of the state government for attracting private
sector activities in the state. Under both the policies, the government believes
in first allowing the directly productive activity (DPA) and leave the
infrastructure development to the felt need or shortages or political pressures
rather than first creating the social overhead capital
(SOC) and wait for its utilisation.  The advantage of such an approach for the
policy-maker is that the government never becomes irrelevant and
inconsequential.  Under both these policies, discretion is retained with the
bureaucrats and politicians.  As a result, replacement of hidden subsidies by
explicit subsidies does not adversely affect the illegal but private market for
favours and discretion where the players are the bureaucrats, politicians and
the potential beneficiaries of the subsidies.  These are, however, the
immediate or short run implications.  In the long run, since the extent of
subsidies (and, hence, price of favours) becomes more transparent under
explicit subsidies than under hidden subsidies, the pay-offs in the game
become more estimable and the competition among players may lead to a
decline in the extent of subsidies.
4.  Most of these state subsidies are offered to the Small Scale Industries (SSI)
which are defined as those having investment in plant and machinery not
exceeding Rs.10 million.  Questions may arise whether they are designed to
promote the SSI or encourage the existing industrial units to break into SSIs
leading to a disincentive for economies of scale.  Such questions are no
doubt very appealing theoretically, but considering the economic
environment, the technical possibilities of economies of scale, the extent of
relevant markets and the current definition of SSI, they sound impractical and
far from reality.  In a recent survey of SSIs in the state (1999-2000), it is found
that, out of 0.25 million SSIs, only 3% units have investment in plant &
machinery in excess of Rs. 2.5 million.  In fact, a closer examination of the list
                                                          
3 It may be noted that corporate income-tax or any similar direct tax on industry and trade is not
under the purview of the state governments in India.7
of subsidies would lead us to believe that their primary explicit objective would
be to protect the SSI rather than to promote them.  This is also politically
important because, like everywhere in the world and particularly in the
developing world, SSIs are seen to be providing major employment
opportunities to the local population outside agricultural sector.  Theoretically
sound and practically acceptable arguments in terms of (1) imperfection of
capital market, (2) unequal access to credit and labour, (3) under-developed
local markets, (4) under-developed entrepreneurial skills, (5) fear of predatory
practices by non-SSIs, and (6) consumers’ concerns, are sufficient to justify
special concern of the state for SSIs.
5.  Subsidies provided to the cluster of units in the form of Employment Park,
hitech park and investment park aim to encourage exploitation of external
economies of scale – both pecuniary and technical.  As pointed out earlier, it
is not seriously examined whether such subsidies are absolutely essential or
inevitable in Gujarat.  Such policies are hardly ever decided independently.
Very often they are imposed by the interstate competition.
Another tax-related measure the state government has taken during the nineties
is to abolish the turnover tax in 1997.  Similarly, Octroi is a major issue in the
State. Octroi is an effective barrier on the movement of goods and creates
additional burden on goods produced outside the city limits but consumed in the
city.  This leads to adverse effects on resource allocation, efficiency and
consumption.  Moreover, it involves delays and inconvenience to the private
sector ultimately giving rise to corruption.  Gujarat government has also
abolished Octroi from 143 towns and 14,000 villages effective from May 2001.
These municipalities, nagar panchayats and village panchayats collected Rs.2.08
billion from Octroi during 2000-01.  This amount is now raised through surcharge
on the sales tax on petroleum products.  The major proportion of Octroi revenue
(above 80%), however, accrues not from these 143 towns and 14000 villages,
but from the 6 major municipal corporations in the state.  Octroi has so far not
been abolished from these 6 corporations in absence of any viable alternative
yielding stable income.  States of Karnataka and Rajasthan had to revert back to
Octroi after abolishing it because the alternative means could not generate the
same amount of stable income for the local governments.  The State Public
Finance Reform Committee (SPFRC) for Gujarat (2000) had strongly
recommended immediate abolition of Octroi and suggested as alternative the
revisions and realistic rates for water-tax, property-tax, health-tax, education-
cess and user fees for various municipal facilities and services. The Gujarat
Government has, however, not shown enough determination to abolish Octroi
from the 6 municipal corporations in the state nor force them to revise their local
taxes and user fees as per the recommendation of SPFRC (2000).
IV.  Provision of Infrastructure and Input Supplies:
In the second half of the nineties, there have been major liberalisation
initiatives in Gujarat in terms of providing infrastructural support and input
supplies to the productive units in the state.  Following certain recommendations8
from the report of the Gujarat State Finance Commission (1994), major reforms
in the power sector were initiated around 1995-96 though not in the right
sequence.  For instance, without addressing the root cause of the problems of
the Gujarat Electricity Board (GEB), viz., inefficiencies in administration,
production, distribution and inadequate tariff rates, the power sector was opened
up to the private sector (see, Morris, 2000).  The policy statements on the
Captive Power Policy (CPP) for the own use and Independent Power Projects
(IPP) for the suppliers to the grid showed eagerness of the state government for
private sector participation by providing guarantees against demand risks &
losses.  The policy succeeded in attracting several IPPs to produce and sell
power to GEB, but failed to make them cost efficient. As a result,  (1) within a
period of only three years 2,300 MW additional power generation capacity was
installed in the state out of the target of 5,000 MW in ten years and Gujarat did
not experience any major power-cut in the last 4 years; (2) Gujarat, which used
to face severe shortage of power, experienced marginal oversupply of electric
power in 1999 and the state government introduced the Tatkal Yojana with high
registration fees for new agricultural connections;  (3) GEB’s financial situation
started deteriorating seriously because it had to buy power at relatively high
prices from IPPs and it could not force tariff revisions nor remove inefficiencies in
terms of transmission and distribution (T&D) loses which were of the order of
34%.  The state government started experiencing unprecedented fiscal drag on
account of GEB and decided to impose a ceiling of Rs.11 billion p.a. as subsidy
to GEB.
This led to formation of the independent regulatory body in February 2000 called
Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (GERC).  It monitors the functioning of
both GEB and IPPs and is empowered to take pricing and investment decisions
in the power sector.  GEB is now required to take prior approval of GERC for any
new Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) and IPPs have also to refer their
expansion plans to GERC.  Installation of meters for the customers of electric
power by June 2002 is made obligatory.  This called forth installing 6 lakh new
meters at Rs. 3 billion cost in about 2 years.  With drought and major earthquake,
this target has not been met.  The trifurcation of GEB into production,
transmission and distribution units is targetted to be over by 2004 and thereafter
the possibility of privatisation is likely to be explored.  The tariff revision for the
agricultural use and industrial use was made by GERC in early 2001 with the
agricultural rates increasing 5 times and the industrial rates by 4% to 15%.  The
implementation, however, is far from satisfactory on account of political
reluctance and opposition.  The GEB is also seriously exploring the possibilities
to cut the cost of raw materials and downsizing from its staff strength of about
50,000.  These measures, if implemented quickly, would certainly help reduce
the financial crises of GEB and thereby the fiscal drag on the state government.
Future growth of the state economy depends critically on how this sector is
handled in the state.
  In the other infrastructural sectors like ports and roads, the private
participation is now encouraged. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) policy on the
lines of the Philippine’s and Chilean experiences is being adopted.  Concepts of9
private ports and the private companies owning their jetties are being
implemented at the Pipavav Port.  Similarly, out of 10 new port projects signed
recently, 6 are planned to be private ports and remaining 4 would be joint sector
ventures.  The Gujarat Maritime Board is also being bifurcated and unbundled.
Air cargo complex at Ahmedabad and such other complexes with private
participation in the matter of storage of specialised cargo are proposed under the
industrial policy of Gujarat, 2000.  The road network to link the port and
construction of underground pipes to transport commodities to and fro ports are
important infrastructural development where clearer policy initiatives are
expected (see, Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industries, 1998).  Gujarat
envisages 389 infrastructure projects upto the year 2010 for implementation with
the private sector participation.  For this, an Asset Management Fund has been
introduced in Gujarat Infrastructural Investment Corporation (GIIC) covering the
debt and equity funds to provide financial assistance to these projects.
Moreover, subsidy @ 25% of infrastructural cost (maximum of Rs. 10 million) is
offered to medium and large industrial projects coming up in the rural areas or
extending the linkage facility to the rural areas.  Similarly, Critical Infrastructure
Fund is introduced through the recent state budget to provide financial
assistance upto 50% of the investment on critical infrastructure requirement on
case to case basis in the industrial area of the state.
Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC) has been providing
comprehensive infrastructural facilities to the industrial units through their estates
and sheds in selected locations in the state.  It has now started handing over the
management of these estates to the users.  In 4 major industrial estates in the
state, Notified Area Authorities are formed and, generally, the association of the
shed-holders in the particular location is given the responsibility.  The shed-users
do not own the sheds but are given long duration (upto 99 years) leasing rights.
The associations work as usual by collecting membership fees and
democratically electing representatives.  Thus, GIDC has started transferring the
operation and management of the estates to the private sector after building the
same.  Similarly, since 1998-99, there has been a systematic effort to involve
representatives of the private sector from the Gujarat Chamber of Commerce
and Industries on the Boards of the state government entities playing vital role in
the infrastructure and related matters of importance to the industry and trade in
the state, e.g. Gujarat Electricity Board, Gujarat Infrastructure Development
Board, Gujarat Pollution Control Board, Gujarat Environment Management
Institute, etc.
In terms of the Input  Supplies, the state governments in India have a
limited but significant role to play.  The most critical inputs, where the policies of
the Gujarat State government can have definite impact are water and coal.
Gujarat is highly deficient in terms of both these basic inputs.  For enhancing the
effective supply of water to its productive users, there are two options: (i)
increase the supply by building irrigation dams and harnessing water through
better water conservation practices; and (ii) increase user charges to reflect the
true scarcity value of the resource.  While the Gujarat government has vigorously
followed the policy of building irrigation dams, it has seriously lagged behind on10
all other fronts. Even the operation and maintenance of the irrigation schemes
are not satisfactorily managed, nor are the charges for water supplied by such
schemes revised regularly and adequately.  After 1981, the water rates were
revised upward only in 1999 for industrial uses and in 2001 for the agricultural
use.  Prior to the revision of the water rates, the cost recovery was hardly at 15%
of the O&M expenditure and 1% return on capital.  The water rates had,
therefore, to be revised substantially and sharply.  For instance, the agricultural
water rates have been raised 2.5 times on an average from their present level in
January 2001 and with annual increase ranging from 15% to 25% for the next
five years.  These rate revisions are expected to ensure almost 100% cost
recovery (as defined earlier) after 5 years.  However, the domestic and municipal
uses of water are still highly subsidised in Gujarat considering the extent of water
scarcity. This is, however, the subject of local bodies and not the state
government.  Moreover, the government of Gujarat also encourages private
sector participation in the irrigation management by involving local bodies and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  In spite of all these, Gujarat is still far
from introducing volumetric basis for water charges.
 As far as coal is concerned, the Indian coal is of inferior quality and together with
the heavy transport cost, it becomes doubly expensive for Gujarat to use it for
power generation.  Gujarat is seriously exploring the possibilities to import better
quality coal from abroad to improve the efficiency and reduce its cost.  Similarly,
other industrial raw materials are also now available from the international
markets since the quantitative restrictions on imports are relaxed at the national
level.  The state government of Gujarat has offered subsidies for improvement of
quality of products including industrial raw materials through the R & D efforts by
the private sector as seen earlier.
The discussion of infrastructure and input supplies would remain
incomplete without considering the Human and Social Infrastructure.  In terms of
the primary education and literacy, Gujarat’s performance has been moderate.
There are serious weaknesses of the state’s secondary and tertiary education
system.  The students of the state lag behind in communication in English
language, a serious handicap in the modern IT and globalised environment.  The
domestic supply of technical and professional personnel in the state is also
inadequate compared to the likely demand.  The remedial action by the state
government in this regard is not sufficient to meet the challenge.  However,
allowing private participation, accreditation and recent revision of user charges
have a potential to go a long way to improve the situation.  Similarly, healthcare
is a weak area in Gujarat.  Again, in this sector the major issues of revision of
user charges, proper investment in facilities, quality of services and efficiency of
the healthcare system need to be addressed seriously.  However, very good
healthcare services at high cost are available selectively in the state.
 Entertainment and hospitality sector has evinced significant growth of late on
account of rationalisation of the state’s policies.  The entertainment tax on
cinema in the state was rationalised recently with only one uniform rate of 100%
replacing a complex rate structure.  Several other forms of entertainment such as11
water parks, fun-fares, exhibitions, etc. are largely exempt in the state under one
or the other pretext.  Similarly, the prohibition law is considerably relaxed on
selective basis for the star hotels to accommodate the liquor consumption of
foreign tourists and guests from outside the state. Although the physical
environment in the large cities in the state is considerably polluted, it is very
liveable on the periphery of cities and in smaller towns and villages.  Moreover,
Gujarat has the least disturbance in industrial peace among all states though the
average industrial wage rate in Gujarat is lower than many states in the country.
The state has a low crime rate relative to the comparable states and very often it
is considered very safe and liveable state socially and culturally.  Out of the two
minor vices of the consumption of alcohol and tobacco (both of which are
addictive and are injurious to health if consumed excessively), the Government of
Gujarat has followed the policy of prohibition of the consumption of alcohol ever
since its inception.  Regarding tobacco, now the orders of the Supreme Court
prohibit its consumption in public places and the free sale of the tobacco
products.  Both these policies have significant cost in terms of revenue foregone
for the governments, but both have substantial benefits in terms of public health
and social environment.  On the whole, the human and social infrastructure
existing in the state has not only been conducive but positively attractive for the
highly skilled migrant labour to settle down in the state and be an integral part of
its growth and development.
V.  Approvals and Clearances for Industries:
Gujarat has continued to achieve high annual growth rates of value added
at 1993-94 constant prices during the nineties in the registered (10%) and
unregistered (8.9%) manufacturing sectors.  In terms of the number of new SSI
units registered, the growth is impressive but declining of late, e.g., 14,631 (or
7.3%) during 1997-98; 14,761 (or 6.8%) during 1998-99; 14,437 (or 6.3%) during
1999-2000; 13,325 (or 5.5%) during 2000-01, and 5.6% during 2001-02 in the
state.  The cumulative SSI registration in Gujarat as on 31
st October 2001 stands
at 263 thousand units. (Govt. of Gujarat, 2002).  From these figures of growth
rates of real value added in the registered manufacturing sector and of the
number of new registered units in the SSI sector, it should be fairly clear that (i)
the large scale units are growing faster than the SSI units in Gujarat;  (ii) the SSI
policy in the state does not seem to have encouraged the investors to break
down their size into fragmented smaller units;  and (iii) the annual growth in the
registration of SSI units is fast coming down during the latter half of the nineties.
Moreover, as per 2000-01Census of SSI, about 76% of the 223 thousand
registered units were found working and majority of them producing the products
not reserved for SSI sector.  Since there is no restriction on the exit from the SSI
sector, survival of 76% units reflects very positively on the existing environment
for SSIs in the state.  The regional spread of the new SSI units registered in the
state during 2000-01 shows that hardly 6.2% of the units are located in the
metropolitan areas; about 60.6% of the new units are located in the urban areas
excluding the metropolitan areas, and about 33.2% of the new units are located
in the rural areas (Government of Gujarat, 2001).  The emerging urban centres,
smaller towns and villages are largely attracting the new SSI units in the state.12
The district and nagar panchayats and municipalities are, therefore, likely to play
important role in attracting the industry and trade.  The state industrial policy
accords priority to promote identified thrust industries including electronics,
engineering, ancillaries, garments, gems and jewellery, food and agri-processing
industries, leather goods, other labour intensive industries and 100% export
oriented units (EOU).  A separate incentive scheme including speedy approval
has been introduced for promotion of such thrust industries in the state.
At the district level, it is the District Industries Centre (DIC) which plays a
pivotal role for promotion of industries.  The principal objective of establishing the
DIC is to provide all assistance under one roof to the entrepreneurs engaged in
different types of industries and to those proposing to establish small and cottage
industries in the district (Government of Gujarat, 1999).  The state government
has made the DICs more effective and operational by delegating the powers
concerning registration for several developmental and subsidy purposes.  Thus,
registration for cash subsidy, SSI registration certificate for sales tax exemption,
recommendation of loans and loans under artisan scheme, etc. have been
delegated to the DICs. This not only simplifies procedures but effectively
decentralises the developmental decisions providing further incentives to the
administration to become people oriented.  As a result, District Industrial
Executive Committee under the chairmanship of either the Member of Parliament
from the district or the Collector meets periodically to discuss and resolve
problems of industrialists to the extent possible with the help of the DIC.
Similarly, to ensure better co-ordination among various agencies working in the
district, a Single Window Industries Follow-up Team (SWIFT) is constituted in
1996-97 in each district under the chairmanship of the district Collector.
Moreover, at the state level a monitoring cell is established in the office of the
Industries Commissioner to monitor the working of the DICs on monthly basis.
The DICs provide registration for both the tiny sector and the small-scale
sector.  The validity for registration under tiny sector is for 5 years.  Thereafter,
the unit has to either renew the registration or get conversion to the SSI
registration.  Since January 1999, there has been a major simplification
introduced to expedite the registration of small and tiny sector units.  Units with
investment upto Rs. 4 million in plants and machinery can now be registered
without inspection.  Officials at DICs feel that more than 90 to 95% of the small
and tiny sector units would be covered here.  This would cover not only the new
units but also the hitherto unregistered existing units.  There is a drive to register
small entrepreneurs, rural artisans, cottage industries, etc. so as to enable them
to get incentives available for such activities and also to strengthen the database
in the sector.
For the registration under SSI sector, the procedures are also fairly
simplified with only the following papers required to be submitted in general: (a)
application form in duplicate;  (b) notarised declaration on Rs. 20 stamp paper;
(c) rent receipt copy and copy of municipal tax bill in urban area;  (d) copy of the
partnership deed or memorandum of articles; (e) copy of the licence under Shop
and Establishment Act;  (f) power NOC or copy of the power bill; (g) sales tax13
number; (h) affidavit of machinery ownership or the list of machinery; and (i) copy
of the first sales bill.  Moreover, the SSI registration is now available almost on
the same day of application. However, if the unit is in the following specified
sectors, the necessary approval/permission is additionally required from the
respective authority:
Sr.









Food and Drug Control Administration
Pollution Control Board
Department of Explosives, Faridabad.
Central Insecticide Board
For larger units, states in India have a limited role.  After liberalisation in this
sector, approvals are needed only for the 6 groups of strategic industries.  For
the rest of large industries, the procedures for environmental clearance are also
simplified.  Similarly, for 100% Export Oriented Units, a letter of permission is
needed from the Secretariat of Industrial Approval (SIA) in the Ministry of
Industry, Government of India to claim any type of benefits.  Gujarat’s new
industrial policy proposes to set up an Export Park with 100% EOUs to overcome
delays involved in such approvals & permissions and derive external economies
of scale in terms of administration of incentives to the 100% EOUs.  Moreover,
the large-scale industries require the non-agricultural land, power connection and
several other infrastructural clearances.  The DICs and the Office of the
Industries Commissioner at the state level assist these large industries in getting
what they want.  DICs also perform the task of follow-up and monitoring the
progress in such cases.
A major step is taken in Gujarat in 1999 to prepare and publish citizen’s
charter for all DICs.  In this charter, not only all procedural requirements are
enlisted but also the time limits are prescribed for various clearances and
approvals needed  -- when the applicants provide all necessary documents and
evidences.  Moreover, this is also monitored strictly by the Industry
Commissioner’s office almost every week since all this is computerised.  Thus,
unnecessary delays and harassment in undertaking productive activity in the
state are likely to reduce and quick disposal of applications and cases can be
expected.  The efficiency and effectiveness of such measures can be judged by
the growth of economic activities in this sector in the state as noted earlier.
The trade and industry often bitterly refer to the inspection visits by different
government officials to the units during the year. Confederation of Indian
Industries (CII), Gujarat chapter has estimated that on an average about 46 visits
of the government officials take place during a year to a registered manufacturing
unit for “inspection” purposes.  Out of these, about two-third visits are from the
central government offices and the remaining one-third visits are from the state
government offices.  For an unregistered manufacturing unit the number of visits
is estimated to be about 28. This excessive number of visits point to the
continuation of the “inspector raj” and high degree of regulation and control14
leading to often unproductive and otherwise avoidable “transaction costs”.
Although the state government recognises the point made by the trade and
industry, the government bureaucracy has not made any significant effort to
reduce these visits by the inspectors.  This is also the area where the central
government has not made any progress for addressing the problem.  This is a
complicated issue because the inspections are necessary for (a) enforcement of
certain standards and laws, and (b) development and entitlement for incentives
based on assets, production, etc. Those units where incentives are either
claimed or sought, most of the approvals and several of the inspections become
necessary.  Otherwise, several of the approvals/permissions and inspections are
not necessary.  The government officials at the state and the district levels in
Gujarat, however, are not very clear about the proportion of the inspection visits
between enforcement and development.
Currently the following Acts and Ordinances need inspection for their satisfactory
enforcement in a production unit: PF Act, Boiler Act, ESI Act, Factory Act, Labour
Act, IDR Act, Pollution Control Act, Food and Drugs Control Act, ISO/ISI Act,
Agmark/FPO Act, Essential Commodity Act, Lubricating Oil and Grease Control
Order, Molasses Control Order, Explosive Act, etc.  Similarly for development
and incentives, the inspection visits are required from banks, financial
institutions, sales tax department, excise department, etc.  Although it is
generally agreed that duplication in inspection visits should be avoided,
everybody feels that the inspection visits by the government officials cannot be
reduced to zero.  Even the concept of a Single Inspection Unit is not generally
considered feasible under the prevailing conditions.  Selective random inspection
visits require a very strict and heavy punishment for the guilty and non-confirming
units.  Given the legal environment and aspects of the law enforcement
prevailing in the state, this does not seem to be an effective option.  Deregulation
and liberalisation in the matters of inspection visits will require to be innovative
and bold because the objective of inspection for enforcement is the welfare and
safety of population and workers, and for developmental incentives is the
reduction of costs to the entrepreneurs.  An effective solution of this problem
could be found only when the developmental incentives do not remain
discretionary but more general and objective rather than selective.
VI.  Land Market Reforms:
Another major liberalisation initiative is the abolition of the urban land
ceiling in the state from April 1999.  This measure is expected to restore the
legitimacy of the transactions in the land market in the urban areas.  Now, the
land can be freely transacted.   It is hoped that the excess land locked up with
several industrial units in the state can now be released for sale and
development purposes.  The effective land prices in the urban areas may,
therefore, fall in the short run and housing and construction activities in the urban
areas are likely to boom.  Moreover, the sale of excess land with industries in
deep trouble can provide very vital doze of fresh resources for their rehabilitation.
However, it is feared that several industrial units located inside the city limits
possess excess land not under their ownership, but on long term lease.  Thus,15
the excess land cannot be sold easily.  The original owner in most cases is the
state government or the municipal body.  The decision to sell these lands or
allow their sale is not taken because it has a potential for malpractices and the
issue is at deadlock.
Gujarat Government also simultaneously amended the Town Planning Act in
1999.  It now requires the buyer of the barren and undeveloped land under the
urban development authorities of different metropolitan areas to keep or
surrender 50% of the land for various infrastructure development like roads,
hospital, park, green land, etc.   Previously the proportion was 35%.  The buyer
retains the ownership of the land and can develop the necessary facilities on it
charging the members joining the scheme.  Alternatively, the government or the
urban development authority can buy the specified land from the buyer and
develop the facilities if required.  As it can be seen, this Act affects only the buyer
on the periphery, which is undeveloped.  There are already some protests and
controversies regarding this Act from the owners of the new development
schemes, but they are being settled.  The purpose of this amendment was to
avoid excess cost and disputes in the matters of providing the required
infrastructure in future as well as make the users pay for the cost of infrastructure
– at least a large proportion of it.  This policy is quite consistent with the overall
direction of reforms in the state.
Recently, on 31
st October 2001, the state government has taken a bold decision
to amend the rent control act to tackle the problem of vacant premises and to
encourage building construction in the urban areas.  It was estimated that only in
5 major cities of Ahmedabad, Surat, Rajkot, Bhavnagar and Jamnagar, more
than 0.8 million houses (dwelling units) are lying vacant.  On the other hand,
there is a tremendous scarcity of houses available on rent.  This was ascribed to
the Bombay Rent Control Act (1947) in force.  The Act is now amended so that
for the new houses constructed or the ones under possession of the owner are
exempted from the provisions of the Act for a period of 10 years.  This will
encourage renting of the premises lying vacant and encourage investments in
the housing and hotel sectors.  This is a major initiative taken by the Gujarat
government in reforming the land and property markets in the urban areas.
In the matter relating to making the land available to industries, the unique
measure taken by the Gujarat government in 1997 is to grant permission to
convert agricultural land to non-agricultural (NA) uses upto the limit of 10
hectares almost automatically.  This cuts down the elaborate process and delays
in obtaining the NA permission for land from the district collectorate and
encourages rapid industrialisation.  This measure is particularly aimed at the
large-scale industries.  Considering low agricultural productivity and high density
of industries with necessary infrastructural support in the state, this measure may
be justified.  However, of late, the state government has realised the urgency to
activate the Land-Use Board and put in place a realistic long term Land-Use
Policy for the state since a significant decline of about 10% in the net cropped
area is noticed over the last 20 years in the state16
VII. Concluding  Remarks:
Table 1 presents the trend rates of growth in different sectors of the
Gujarat economy for the periods 1980-92 and 1991-01 based on the semi-
logarithmic trend regressions on the GSDP at 1993-94 prices by sectors.  The
table helps us to examine the shift in implicit emphasis on different sectors in the
development strategy followed by Gujarat after the reforms were initiated at the
national level, i.e. 1991-92.
It can be readily seen that out of the 17 sectors, 11 sectors show
statistically significant acceleration or deceleration in the basic trend rate of
growth after 1991-92 in Gujarat.  The 6 sectors that do not show statistically
significant acceleration/deceleration in the growth include agriculture, registered
manufacturing, electricity, railways, other transport, and storage.  On the other
hand, forestry unregistered manufacturing, construction, trade and hotels,
communication, public administration, and other services have experienced
significant acceleration in their growth after 1991-92 in Gujarat.  These are the
sectors where the emphasis in the development strategy of Gujarat seems to
have shifter during the reform period.  Surprisingly, the fishing, mining &
quarrying, banking & insurance, and real estate sectors in Gujarat are
experiencing a significant deceleration in their growth during the reform period.
The first two of these are the natural resource-based sectors where Gujarat has
a considerable potential, whereas the other two are the modern financial service
sectors in which Gujarat should have substantial advantage given its emphasis
on manufacturing and trade.  However, significant deceleration in the growth in
these sectors implies that the focus of the development strategy in Gujarat is
shifting away from the organised manufacturing and services to the unorganised
sectors of the economy after 1991-92.
Finally, to sum up the discussion, we can say that Gujarat made subtle
and significant changes in its policies to supplement the economic reforms
initiated at the central government level.  During the initial phase of liberalising
the industrial sector by the Centre, Gujarat did not have to make any major
changes in its policies.  The changes in the economic environment made its
strategy and policies followed till that point very relevant and attractive for the
growth of the private enterprise in the state.  However, after 1996 when the
reform process at the Centre slackened considerably, Gujarat started its major
efforts at the state level liberalisation. In this, the state government is constrained
by the political consideration to protect the small and medium enterprises from
the adverse effects of the liberalisation and globalisation.  Of late, Gujarat seems
to have some confusion over its development strategy.  Within the overall
strategy of ‘growth through private enterprise,’ the state wants to achieve high
efficiency and productivity growth of resources employed in the state and
simultaneously desires to protect some of the less efficient small and medium
enterprises from the global competition with all kinds of subsidies.  This17
Table 1:  Growth and Acceleration in GSDP at Constant (1993-94) Prices in Gujarat (1980-01)
Sr.
No. Dependent Variable Intercept Basic Trend Rate Acceleration R
2
Ab 1 b2
12 3 4 5 6
1 AGRICULTURE 13.7580 0.0091 0.0175 0.1537
(88.6330) (0.4790) (0.4560) (1.6350)
2 FOREST & LOG 10.6620 -0.0023 0.0224 0.8010
(608.8430) (-1.087) (5.1640) (36.2440)
3 FISHING 10.0320 0.0926 -0.0670 0.9499
(172.2000) (12.9570) (-4.634) (170.7050)
4 MINING & QUARRY 11.1910 0.0611 -0.0480 0.9603
(339.8300) (15.1430) (-5.935) (217.7400)
5 REGISTERED MFG. 12.6790 0.0779 0.0220 0.9670
(205.5301) (10.2990) (1.4440) (267.8435)
6 UN-REGISTERED MFG. 11.9830 0.0692 0.0196 0.9813
(290.4290) (13.6830) (1.9200) (472.9050)
7 ELECT, GAS, WATER SUP 10.3710 0.1028 -0.0150 0.9903
(283.6550) (22.9210) (-1.657) (924.6720)
8 CONSTRUCTION 11.5950 0.0439 0.0252 0.9475
(233.1319) (7.1928) (2.0432) (162.7330)
9 TRADE,HOTEL,REST. 12.4700 0.0521 0.0268 0.9781
(339.7560) (11.5750) (2.9456) (403.4360)
10 RAILWAY 10.7680 0.0258 0.0039 0.9075
(318.5230) (6.2350) (0.4680) (88.3304)
11 OTHER TRANS. 11.1850 0.0820 -0.0130 0.9187
(128.3820) (7.6700) (-0.627) (101.7820)
12 STORAGE 7.0447 0.0138 0.0058 0.4664
(104.4090) (1.6706) (0.3520) (7.8670)
13 COMMUNITY 10.1200 0.0591 0.0947 0.9947
(353.7940) (16.8490) (13.3620) (1704.8340)
14 BANKING INSURANCE. 10.6740 0.1435 -0.0500 0.9848
(183.0020) (20.0530) (-3.490) (586.2330)
15 REAL ESTATE 12.2320 0.0302 -0.0034 0.9998
(8196.4060) (165.2190) (-9.0779) (49563.8400)
16 PUB. ADMIN 11.2530 0.0476 0.0338 0.9372
(180.6310) (6.2280) (2.1900) (134.4450)
17 OTHER SERVICES 11.6950 0.0504 0.0336 0.9939
(596.2060) (20.9700) (6.9260) 1478.575)
TOTAL GSDP 14.7490 0.0466 0.0243 0.9644
(348.8210) (8.9810) (2.3230) (244.4120)
Note: 1) The regression Equation is: Y = a + b1t + b2 (t-t
* )D where t
* = 12 corresponding to the
              year 1991-92; and D is dummy such that D = 0 for t < 12 and D=1 for t > = 12.
         2)  For cols. 3 to 5, figures in parentheses are t-values; and for col.6, the figures in parentheses
              are f-values.
         3) The critical values of t-stat are 2.09 and 1.73 for respectively 5% and 10% level of
             significance.18
confusion must end sooner than later.  No sooner does the national reform
process get on the track than Gujarat would realise its benefits and resolve this
confusion.  In the meantime the focus of the development strategy shifted away
from the organised manufacturing activity to the unorganised sectors in the state.
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